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Cross-border data flows are now a fundamental component of 
commerce. This paper explores the implications of ever-improving 
digital technology (particularly cloud computing technology) and 
examines some major policy and legal challenges in relation to cross-
border personal data protection, which governments, businesses, and 
individual consumers have to address in the context of cloud computing 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. 
This paper first examines the recent development of cloud 
computing (CC) technology and personal data protection. It then focuses 
on three challenging areas for transnational personal data protection: 
privacy and security, jurisdiction, and convergence. It also examines the 
new requirements under the TPP on cross-border data flows and data 
localization and their implications on existing challenges and future 
privacy law reform. It contends, although TPP is the ―first‖ international 
agreement establishing a link between privacy and trade, its impacts 
should be not overstated. Given the borderless nature of the Internet, in 
order to identify an effective solution, the relevant laws and policies in 
some major economies (including both TPP and non TPP countries), 
such as the United States, the European Union, China and Australia, are 
delineated and compared. Finally, in line with the recent debates on TPP 
withdrawal in the US and Australia, it attempts to explore both 
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opportunities and risks of joining or withdrawing from the TPP, and 
provide some practical suggestions for future law reform. 
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INTRODUCTION: CLOUD COMPUTING V. UNPREDICTABILITY OF DATA 
FLOWS 
The Internet is relentlessly affecting all of our institutions, forms 
of communication, and social habits.1 Increases in speed and bandwidth 
now make Cloud Computing (CC) a significant new player in the way 
information is collected, stored, handled, and distributed by individuals, 
business, and government agencies.2 This not only profoundly impacts 
cross-border personal data transfer and protection, but also all 
information-related international trade. 
The significance of CC and cross-border personal data protection 
to international trade has been reorganized by most major economies and 
has become an integral part of many regional trade agreements, including 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). Like many FTAs, TPP contains a special chapter on 
E-Commerce and cross-border personal data flows, which imposes extra 
                                                     
 1 Christina Spiesel, Eyes on the Horizon, 58 MCGILL L.J. 1061, 1061 (2013). 
 2 PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT‘L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., THE NIST 
DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, 2011). 
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obligations for members to follow.3 In recent times, a new tendency has 
become apparent—as an increasing number of countries are 
reconsidering their involvement in existing multilateral trade 
arrangements, including the TPP and FTAs.4 
This paper aims to examine the current issues related to cross-
border personal data protection in the context of Cloud Computing and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. In line with the recent debates 
on the possible withdrawal of the United States and Australia from the 
TPP, both the opportunities and risks of joining in or withdrawing from 
the TPP will be identified alongside some practical solutions for 
regulators in different national contexts. 
More specifically, first, this paper examines the recent 
development of Cloud Computin technology and personal data 
protection. It then focuses on three challenging areas for transitional 
personal data protection. Namely, the issues associated with privacy and 
security, jurisdiction, and convergence. It then examines the new 
requirements under the TPP on cross-border data flows and data 
localization and its implications on existing challenges and future 
privacy law reform. It contends, although the TPP is the ―first‖ 
international agreement establishing a link between privacy and trade, its 
impacts should not be overstated. Given the borderless nature of the 
Internet, in order to identify an effective solution, the relevant laws and 
policies in some major economies (including both TPP signatories and 
non TPP signatory countries), such as the United States, the European 
Union, China, and Australia, are examined and compared. Finally, in line 
with the recent debates on the TPP withdrawal in the United States and 
Australia, it attempts to explore both opportunities and risks of joining in 
or withdrawing from the TPP. Specifically, it argues that prospective 
signatories must undertake a carefully considered cost-benefit analysis 
before entering into the TPP. Finally, some practical suggestions are 
provided for future law reform drawing on insights from the TPP. 
                                                     
 3 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, AUSTL. GOV‘T DEP‘T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE ch. 14 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Pages/official-
documents.aspx [hereinafter TPP]. 
 4 Graham Greenleaf, The TPP & Other Free Trade Agreements: Faustian Bargains for Privacy? 
(UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2016-08, Feb. 14, 2016) (providing many specific examples in 
relation to this type of FTAs). 
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I. CLOUD COMPUTING & TRANSNATIONAL NATURE 
Before examining the in-depth impacts, it is necessary to 
understand the key feature of CC technology. What is Cloud Computing? 
Generally speaking, CC is a relatively new business model in the 
information communication technology (ICT) industry. Scientists, law 
professors, and journalists often provide differing definitions of CC.5 
Indeed, after years of deliberation and 15 drafts, the U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology‘s (NIST) arrived at the following 
definition for Cloud Computing in 2011.6 The NIST Definition of Cloud 
Computing states, ―cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.‖7 Alternatively, in 
2013 Harvard University Law Professor Urs Gasser and David R. 
O‘Brien defined CC as, ―an umbrella term for an emerging trend in 
which many aspects of computing, such as information processing, 
collection, storage, and analysis, have transitioned from localized 
systems (i.e., personal computers and workstations) to shared, remote 
systems (i.e., servers and infrastructure accessed through the Internet.)‖8 
Xath Cruz, an online editor of Cloud Times, defined CC more simply, as 
―any type of computing that can be done remotely through the Internet 
instead of locally.‖9 Indeed, it is not an easy task to provide a strict and 
standardized definition of CC since there are different variations and 
technologies involved, and CC itself is an evolving technology. 
In comparison with traditional Internet technology, one of the 
major improvements of CC is that computational resources under CC 
                                                     
 5 See Steven Rosenbush, The Morning Download: Cloud Computing Hazy Meaning Creates 
Confusion for CIO‘s, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2016), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/10/18/themorningdownloadcloudcomputingshazymeaningcreatesc
onfusionforcios/; Defining Cloud Computing, N.Z. L. SOC‘Y (July 4, 2014), 
https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/lawtalk/lawtalk-archives/issue-845/defining-cloud-computing; 
Lizhe Wang, Jie Tao, & Marcel Kunze, Scientific Cloud Computing: Early Definition and 
Experience, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY (2008). 
 6 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7 Id. 
 8 DAVID R. O‘BRIEN & URS GASSER, Cloud Computing and the Roles of Governments, in 
INTERNET MONITOR 2013: REFLECTIONS ON THE DIGITAL WORLD 25, 25 (Urs Gasser, Robert 
Faris & Rebekah Heacock eds., 2013). 
 9 Xath Cruz, Cloud Computing and its Legal Implications, CLOUD TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://cloudtimes.org/2012/12/03/cloud-computing-and-its-legal-implications/. 
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technology are elastic and can be shared by many simultaneous remote 
users and can be scaled up or down with demand.10 This may 
significantly reduce the operational costs and increase the ease of service 
providers and users. For example, private clouds can be scaled to meet 
client‘s changing IT system demands. Public users can store their MP3 
music, video, photos, and documents online instead of personal 
computers at home. This gives users the freedom to access their 
documents wherever they can find the means to access the Internet. This 
major improvement offers substantial business opportunities, but also 
initiates many potential legal challenges for personal data protection, 
particularly cross-border personal data protection. 
A key feature of CC technology is that it is transnational in 
nature. CC technology permits data transmissions that span the globe. 
Data processing activities shift from country-to-country depending on 
load capacity, time of day, and a variety of other factors. These decisions 
are sometimes ―made in real time and by machines rather than human.‖11 
As such, cloud users—even cloud providers—may not be able to know 
the true location of physical infrastructure as well as the true location of 
personal data. Although traditional Internet technology allows cross-
border data transactions, in these transactions, data owners and 
processors seem to have better control over the data they process. At 
least, they know where the data is stored (location of database 
infrastructure) and where the data will be sent to (destination of data). As 
such, CC has arguably increased the ―unpredictability‖ of data control 
and the uncertainty of legal compliance. 
This is particularly pertinent in the current international trade 
environment. A company, either operating internationally or dealing with 
international clients, has to comply with the laws in relevant countries. If 
the company uses a cloud service provided by any third party, the 
provider is required to ensure compliance with the relevant laws of the 
country in question. For example, if an Australian company has entered 
into an agreement with a cloud provider in the United States, but the 
cloud provider hosts the data on a server in the EU, this means that the 
company needs to comply with laws in Australia, the U.S., and the EU. It 
also means that the company needs to guarantee that its cloud service 
                                                     
 10 NIKOLAS ROMAN HERBST, SAMUEL KOUNEV & RALF REUSSNER, ELASTICITY IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING: WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT IS NOT (2013). 
 11 Paul M. Schwartz, EU Privacy and the Cloud: Consent and Jurisdiction Under the Proposed 
Regulation, 12 BNA PRIVACY AND SECURITY L. REP. 718, 718 (2013). 
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provider complies with the laws (such as privacy law) in all three 
different jurisdictions. 
II. MAJOR CHALLENGES IN RELATION TO CROSS-BORDER PERSONAL 
DATA PROTECTION 
Before examining the potential impacts of the TPP on cross-
border personal data flows and Electronic Commerce (EC), it is 
necessary to examine the traditional legal challenges CC instigates about 
personal data protection, particularly cross-border personal data 
protection. Among all potential legal challenges, both CC service 
providers and users should take particular note of three major challenges: 
(1) jurisdiction; (2) privacy and security; and (3) convergence. 
A. THE JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE 
Many cloud providers are based overseas, particularly low-cost 
high-volume providers of applications. For example, if a customer in 
China signs a cloud service contract containing a ―jurisdiction clause‖ 
which refers to Californian law, it is likely that the customer will refrain 
from enforcing their contract overseas due to financial limitations. 
As businesses move towards using cloud services, data location 
becomes increasingly important. Subsequently, the clauses in relation to 
location of data perform an important role in determining the 
jurisdiction, as well as the level of data and privacy protection cloud 
users are afforded. For example, data protection in developed countries 
(such as the U.S. and Australia) may be markedly different from that of 
developing countries (such as China and India).12 The United States 
introduced its Privacy Act in 1974.13 In contrast, China‘s Personal 
Information Protection Law is still in the drafting process.14 
                                                     
 12 China does not have a formal Privacy Act yet. It is still in the drafting process. For more details, 
please see another paper of mine: Graham Greenleaf and George Tian, Data Protection Widened 
by China‘s Consumer Law Changes, 126 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT‘L REP. 127, (Dec. 2013). 
 13 See The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014), which ―establishes a code of fair 
information practices that governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of 
information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies.‖ 
Privacy Act of 1974, DEP‘T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last 
updated July 17, 2015). 
 14 See PAUL DE HERT AND VAGELIS PAPAKONSTANTINOU, THE DATA PROTECTION REGIME IN 
CHINA 23 (2015). 
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Traditionally, it is relatively easy to find the location of web 
servers, and data is usually stored in the data centers of web service 
providers. In a cloud environment, many cloud providers are using 
virtual servers to provide data storage and process services. It is not 
always easy to identify where the data is actually located. As introduced 
above, in many circumstances, even cloud service providers may not 
know the true location of data storage.15 
In addition, both the primary location of the data and any backup 
locations determine which countries‘ laws and regulations must be 
followed. Some large cloud service providers have data centers in 
different countries. Amazon Ltd. Co. for example has its data centers in 
California, USA, but it also has its backup data centers in many other 
places, including London and Tokyo.16 The cost burden on the user to 
pursue legal proceedings or enforce the contract compounded by the lack 
of information available and the various political contexts involved 
increases the complexity of jurisdiction determination. For example, if 
Japan has been determined to have a jurisdiction (assuming the data 
breach was found in the data center located in Tokyo), the cost burden on 
the user to pursue legal proceedings in Japan would arguably be higher 
since many evidential documents need to be translated into Japanese. 
Thus, it is important to make sure that the locations of all relevant data 
centers have been fully disclosed under SLAs so that the parties can 
anticipate potential legal risks. 
1. Jurisdiction Clauses & Data Location Clauses under Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs) 
In cloud-computing related disputes, jurisdictional issues are 
always complex. Many potential jurisdictional challenges have been 
generated or intensified through cloud service contracts.17 Jurisdiction 
clauses in cloud service contracts specify the applicable law governing 
the contract. For example, an American provider with a data center in 
Singapore can stipulate that a contract with an Australian customer is 
subject to Singaporean law, while contracts with American citizens are 
                                                     
 15 Schwartz, supra note 11. 
 16 See AWS Global Infrastructure, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/about-
aws/global-infrastructure (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (providing a map of Amazon‘s global 
infrastructure). 
 17 E.g., TPP, supra note 3. 
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governed by the laws of the United States.18 Contracts that contain 
jurisdiction clauses that direct the applicable law away from where the 
user is domiciled may result in a limited capacity to enforce the contract. 
Accordingly, both cloud providers and users need to be attentive to 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Indeed, cloud providers and users 
need to pay particular attention to the ―jurisdiction clause‖ and the ―data 
location clause‖ under SLAs. 19 
2. Service Level Agreements v. Access by Governments 
A good SLA alone, even one with a proper ―jurisdiction clause,‖ 
does not mean that cloud users and providers are free from all potential 
jurisdictional challenges. When a cloud service provider has data centers 
in various countries, in addition to data breach and abuse by an 
individual or any third-party overseas, there is a risk of data breach by 
governments, by both domestic and foreign governments.20 In addition, 
governments often have ―dual roles‖ in relation to access to personal data 
in the cloud—either as regulators or as cloud service users.21 
Governments in many countries have regulations to compel 
cloud service providers to provide governments‘ access to personal data 
in certain circumstances, such as national security or law enforcement.22 
In such circumstances, it is always difficult for cloud service providers to 
refuse. Whilst some Internet service providers may object, many feel 
compelled to provide government access to their customers‘ personal 
data, should the request be made.23 A typical example is the United States 
Government‘s Patriot Act. Many recent reports and press articles have 
                                                     
 18 MARK VINCENT, NICK HART &  KATE MORTON, TRUMAN HOYLE, CLOUD COMPUTING 
CONTRACTS WHITE PAPER: A SURVEY OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS (Apr. 5, 2011). 
 19 Sasha Segall, Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States Government‘s Move to Cloud 
Computing Technology, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1109 (2013) 
(stating that ―the location of data storage often has choice-of-law implications‖). 
 20 See, e.g., Alan Travis, UK Security Agencies Unlawfully Collected Data for 17 Years, Court 
Rules, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 18, 2016; Robert McMillan & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Russian 
Hacks Show Cybersecurity Limits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2016. 
 21 See, e.g., USA Patriot Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (2006); ALLEN & OVERY, THE EU 
GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2016) 
http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Radical%20changes%20to%20European
%20data%20protection%20legislation.pdf. 
 22 USA Patriot Act § 2511; Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (UK). 
 23 Francoise Gilbert, USA Patriot Act Effect on Cloud Computing Services, IT LAW GROUP, 
http://www.itlawgroup.com/resources/articles/113-usa-patriot-act-effect-on-cloud-computing-
services (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
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expressed concern and asserted, ―The US government has the unfettered 
ability to obtain access to data stored outside the United States by US 
cloud service providers or their foreign subsidiaries.‖24 There are also 
concerns that the Patriot Act, ―Allows US law enforcement and national 
security agencies unrestricted access to any data, anywhere, anytime.‖25 
Like the United States, other jurisdictions have comparable 
legislation to enable their government agencies to require access to 
personal information in the context of national security or law 
enforcement. For example, in addition to the Chinese Counter-Terrorism 
Law (introduced above), the Standing Committee of the National 
People‘s Congress approved the National Security Law of China, 
effective as of July 1 2015, which contains detailed requirements in 
relation to the governments‘ access to personal data.26 Furthermore, the 
Chinese State Internet Information Office (SIIO) announced a draft of 
new procedures to assess potential security problems with Internet 
technology and services used by sectors relating to national security and 
the public interest.27 The new procedures propose the establishment of an 
Internet security assessment regime for important Internet related 
products/services and their suppliers entering the Chinese marketplace.28 
In other words, the products and services, which do not comply with the 
relevant security requirements, arguably, will be excluded from use in 
China. This new legislation and the accompanying procedures may 
oblige technical companies to share sensitive data and technology, like 
encryption processes (as introduced above). Companies—such as Cisco 
Systems, IBM, and Microsoft—would be affected by the procedures. It 
seems that, through these new regulations, China is attempting to impose 
similar restrictions to those in the United States. 
In summary, laws or procedures, which compel cloud service 
providers to allow governments‘ access to personal data, may be a major 
headache for companies that sell Internet hardware and services 
overseas, especially to governmental sectors. On the one hand, these 
                                                     
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.; USA Patriot Act § 2511. 
 26 National Security Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat‘l People‘s Cong., July 1, 2015), art. 51. 
 27 See Procedural Regulations for Administrative Law Enforcement Concerning Internet 
Information Content Management (Opinion-Seeking Draft), art. 1 (Rogier Creemers, ed., Jan. 14, 
2016), https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/01/14/procedural-regulations-for-
administrative-law-enforcement-concerning-internet-information-content-management-opinion-
seeking-draft/. 
 28 Id. at art. 5. 
TIAN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:34 PM 
Vol. 34, No. 2  Join or Withdraw 377 
companies are obligated to protect their customers against inadequate 
data protection, as well as intrusive government surveillance practices.29 
On the other hand, they need to be aware of the potential risks of 
breaching local laws or policies relating to national security as they 
operate businesses overseas. 
B. THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY CHALLENGE 
Data security is a major concern for any business or individual 
considering moving to the Cloud. There are a number of privacy and 
security risks for personal data protection in the cloud, particularly cross-
border data protection. 
1. Cross-Country Data Transfer and Legal Compliance 
Data on the Internet will be transferred across the world,30 and 
therefore data owners, cloud service providers, and data users need to 
deal with the privacy and security risks associated with cross-country 
data transition and legal compliance issues in relation to cross-country 
data transition.31 
Some countries have amended their domestic laws to address 
cross-country data transition. For example, in March 2014, Australia 
introduced a range of updated privacy laws and replaced the National 
Privacy Principles (NPPs) with the Australian Privacy Principles (the 
APPs).32 The new APPs contain a special principle on cross-border 
disclosure of personal information. This principle requires, prior to the 
disclosure of personal information relating to an overseas recipient, that 
an APP entity takes reasonable steps to ensure that the Australian 
Privacy principles are not breached.33 Similarly, the data protection laws 
                                                     
 29 Camille Blackburn, New Technology, Personal Data Protection and Implications for Financial 
Services Regulations, JASSA THE FINSIA J. OF APPLIED FIN. 62 (2015). 
 30 See also Milton L. Mueller, The Politics and Issues of Internet Governance, INST. FOR RES. & 
DEBATE OF GOVERNANCE (2007), http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/en/analyse/fiche-analyse-
265.html. 
 31 Peter K. Yu, Towards the Seamless Global Distribution of Cloud Content, in PRIVACY AND 
LEGAL ISSUES IN CLOUD COMPUTING, 180–81 (Anne S.Y. Cheung & Rolf H. Weber, eds., 2015) 
(providing a discussion on ―territoriality questions implicated by cloud computing‖). 
 32  Privacy Fact Sheet 17: Australian Privacy Principles, AUSTL. GOV‘T: OFF. OF THE AUSTL. 
INFO. COMM‘R (Feb. 2013), https://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-fact-sheets/privacy-fact-sheet-17-australian-privacy-principles_2.pdf. 
 33 It explicitly provided that ―before an APP entity discloses personal information about an 
individual to a person (the overseas recipient):. . . the entity must take such steps as are 
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of the European Union (EU) member states also have provisions that 
specifically limit the ways in which the transfer of personal data outside 
these regions need to be handled.34 The European Data Protection 
Directive (the Directive) obligates all collectors of the data or data 
controllers to inform individuals when their data will be sent and 
processed outside of the EU, and obligates all the data controllers and 
processors to have contracts approved by the Data Protection Authority 
in advance.35 Arguably, these laws have a direct impact on how personal 
information is stored and transferred effectively overseas. 
Despite growing regulation in the ICT sector in Europe, the 
United States and Australia, as well as many other countries, such as 
China, have not yet enacted similar laws addressing cross-border data 
transfer issues. Unlike in the European Union and various other Asia-
Pacific countries, there is no single law in China aiming exclusively at 
personal data protection or cross-country data transfer. In December 
2012, the National People‘s Congress Standing Committee took steps 
toward strengthening electronic data protection by issuing its Decision 
on Strengthening Online Information Protection.36 This decision does not 
extend to address the issues pertaining to transnational data transfer 
specifically. 
The globalized nature of data transfer in contrast with the 
limitations of national law has created a patchwork system of laws that 
apply at the domestic level, although the storage and transfer of data is 
international. As such, when cloud service providers set up data storage 
centers, to avoid legal ramifications they need to be aware of and comply 
with the laws in the country in which their data storage centers are 
located, particularly the laws in relation to cross-border data transfer. 
Likewise, when cloud users choose their cloud service providers; they 
should be more informed of the location of their cloud service provider‘s 
                                                     
reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the 
Australian Privacy Principles . . . in relation to the information.‖  Id. 
 34 See Council Directive 95/46 arts. 26, 31 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 Oct. 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 35  Id. The European Commission (EC) even provides the Model Contracts for the transfer of 
personal data to third countries. The Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third 
Countries, EUROPEAN COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/transfer/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 24, 2016). 
 36 National People‘s Congress Standing Committee Decision Concerning Strengthening Network 
Information Protection (Rogier Creemers, ed., Dec. 28, 2012), 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/12/28/national-peoples-congress-standing-
committee-decision-concerning-strengthening-network-information-protection/. 
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data storage infrastructure,37 and the potential risk of their personal data 
being unprotected by the laws of the country where the user is based, 
which may result in a false expectation of privacy. 
2. Cross-Country Outsourcing Arrangements 
The subcontracting and outsourcing arrangements that involve 
foreign companies also present extra risks for both cloud service 
providers and users. These include: (1) risks for subcontractor businesses 
who must navigate with their relevant legal obligations in protecting 
personal data under foreign laws; and (2) privacy and security risks for 
the user who is perhaps unaware of the commercial or political 
arrangements relating to their personal data and the subsequent 
application of foreign laws. 
Although the cloud provider market is expanding, there are still 
only a limited number of large companies that have the capacity to offer 
large-scale application and data hosting independently.38 As a 
consequence, many small and medium companies may subcontract some 
or all of the hosting to another company, including companies in another 
country. When entering an agreement with a cloud service provider in 
the United States, users should not simply assume the data center is 
located in the United States and the US Privacy Act of 1974 will be 
applied.39 Rather, if the cloud service provider is subcontracting with 
another cloud service provider who has data centers overseas, such as in 
Ireland or China, the subcontractor arguably is also required to follow the 
laws in these countries (as discussed above). And this may place some 
unexpected risks for users. For example, in certain regions, laws may 
allow local government unlimited access to the data regardless of its 
sensitivity. Additionally, cloud service providers may even be limited (or 
prohibited) from encrypting the data without ensuring local authorities 
can decrypt it as needed.40 For example, in December 2015, China‘s 
Congress passed the new ―Counter-Terrorism Law‖ that requires 
                                                     
 37 This includes their primary and backup locations, as well as any intermediate locations if data is 
being transferred between jurisdictions. 
 38 Apple has spent 5 billion dollars on creating cloud computing data storage centers. Likewise, 
Facebook has acquired a 430, 000 square feet warehouse for the purposes of storage, while 
Google has developed ‗Googleplex‘ ‗a collection of movable glass buildings that can expand or 
contract as business requires. Other major companies include Samsung and Uber. See Why 
Giants Thrive, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2016). 
 39 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (1974). 
 40 Investigatory Powers Bill 2016, c. 25 (UK). 
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technology companies to assist the government in decrypting content in 
certain circumstances.41 
As such, when choosing cloud service providers, users should be 
aware of any subcontracting arrangements in order to understand not 
only who will deliver the service but also who legally has access to the 
data. Otherwise, this may incur unnecessary data security risks. 
C. CONVERGENCE CHALLENGE 
Convergence challenges for cross-border personal data 
protection are two-fold: (1) challenges from the convergence of 
technology; and (2) challenges from the convergence of laws. 
1. Challenges from Convergence of Technology 
As computing and IT become further embedded into our daily 
activities and relationships, IT provides ―not only a technology but also a 
core thing to integrate and converge with several other industry 
technologies, causing new industries, products and services.‖42 
Blackman43 uses ―digital convergence‖ to explain the evolution of 
technology services and industry, however the term has been further 
developed by Collins44 and Gates45 to describe the ―coming together of 
telecommunications, computing and broadcasting into a single digital bit 
stream.‖ 46 Digital convergence presents both opportunities and risks; it 
has significantly promoted innovation, efficiency, and contributed to 
public enjoyment of new technology. It also poses challenges, however, 
                                                     
 41 Counter-Terrorism Law of the People‘s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Dec. 27, 2015), art. 18. 
 42 Digital Convergence and Interface for Cloud Computing Era, DEPENDABLE COMPUTING LAB, 
http://dclab.yonsei.ac.kr/research/digital-convergence-and-interface-for-cloud-computing-era/ 
(last visited Feb 18, 2017). 
 43 Colin R. Blackman, Convergence between Telecommunications and Other Media: How Should 
Regulation Adapt?, 22 TELECOMM. POL‘Y 163, 164–65 (1998). 
 44 Richard Collins, Back To The Future: Digital Television and Convergence in the United 
Kingdom, 22 TELECOMM. POL‘Y 383, 385 (1998). 
 45 Arlan Gates, Convergence and Competition: Technological Change, Industry Concentration, 
and Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Sector, 58 U. OF TORONTO FAC. OF L. REV. 
83 (2000). 
 46 Martha Garcia-Murillo & Ian Macinnes, The Impact of Technological Convergence on the 
Regulation of ICT Industries, 5 INT‘L J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 57, 57 (2002). 
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for traditional models of commercializing and protecting personal 
information (personal data), including cross-border personal data.47 
A recent example highlighting these challenges is the new 
mobile application being promoted by insurance giant AAMI.48 The 
application aims to record and reward safe driving and discourage illegal 
driving behavior, such as texting, phoning, and speeding.49 Not 
publicized is the possibility that the Safe Driver App may not only allow 
AAMI to increase insurance premiums based on a driver‘s score, but also 
enable AAMI to hand over data to police without notifying application 
users.50 As discussed above, AAMI, as a company is legally able to 
disclose and share its customers‘ personal information with any third 
party, including law enforcement agencies and in doing so, possibly 
provide incriminating evidence against their customers. Accordingly, this 
app has instigated an intense debate on the legality of this new business 
model.51 
2. Challenges from Convergence of Law 
Like many other new cloud business models, the AAMI app may 
result in potential disputes across various areas of law (such as privacy, 
road safety, competition, and consumer protection laws) rather than a 
dispute being contained solely within insurance law.52 It is clear that the 
―convergence of technology‖ has intensified the ―convergence of law‖ 
across different law sectors. The Internet is borderless in nature. When 
goods or service providers put their products or services (including 
intangible products, such as gaming software) on the Internet, they are 
                                                     
 47 Paul T. Jaeger et al., Where is the Cloud? Geography, Economics, Environment, and Jurisdiction 
in Cloud Computing, 14 FIRST MONDAY, (May 4 2009), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2456/2171 (Cloud computing ―places 
enormous capacity and power in the hand of users. As an emerging new technology, however, 
cloud computing also raises significant questions about resources, economics, politics, the 
environment, and the laws‖). 
 48 See Margot O‘Neill, Data Retention: AAMI Safe Driver App Could See Information Handed to 
Police, Premiums Go Up, ABC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-
10/aami-safe-driver-app-data-retention/6292198. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. The AAMI app aims to record and reward safe driving, and to discourage illegal driving 
behaviour, including texting, phoning and speeding (road safety law). But it may also enable 
AAMI to hand over data to police from its Safe Driver App without the consent from app users 
(privacy law) and to increase insurance premiums based on a driver‘s score (insurance, and 
competition and consumer law). 
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trading with customers worldwide rather than a single national market. 
As a consequence, the laws in foreign countries may extend the 
jurisdictions they are subject to. 
For example, in another recent case in Australia, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) sued a US software 
publisher, Valve Software, in the Australian Federal Court on the 
grounds that Valve‘s refund policies and subscriber agreements for its 
―Steam‖ platform (cloud platform) have breached the Australian 
Consumer Law (ACL).53 Valve Corporation is a company incorporated in 
the United States. Its online computer game distribution platform (known 
as ―Steam‖) has over 125 million users worldwide.54 Valve does not have 
physical retail stores in Australia, but it has approximately 2.2 million 
users in Australia.55 
Valve Corporation does not admit that it operated business in 
Australia, although it admits that it has made available to Australian 
consumers, online access to use video games through Steam Client 
pursuant to the terms of a Steam Subscriber Agreement (SSA).56 Valve 
further claims the SSA was made under the law of the State of 
Washington in the United States and is not a contract to which the 
Australian consumer law applies.57 In March 2016, the Australian court 
made a decision in favor of the ACCC. Justice Edelman concluded that, 
in any event, Valve was carrying on business in Australia and therefore 
Australian consumer law should apply.58 Following this reasoning, when 
any Australian companies provide online gaming services to United 
States users or users in other countries, the consumer laws in these 
countries could arguably apply to the Australian companies. In summary, 
the increasing complexity of legal issues compounded by the multiplicity 
of jurisdictions to which companies are subject creates a legal terrain that 
is difficult for cloud computing providers to navigate. 
                                                     
 53 Australian Competition & Consumer Comm‘n v Valve Corp. [No. 3], 2016 FCA 196 (Austl.). 
 54 Luke Plunkett, There Are Over 125 Million ―Active‖ Steam Accounts., KOTAKU (Feb. 24, 2015, 
7:00 p.m.), http://kotaku.com/there-are-over-125-million-steam-accounts-1687820875. 
 55 Press Release, Austl. Competition and Consumer Comm‘n, Federal Court Finds Valve Made 
Misleading Representations About Consumer Guarantees (Mar. 29, 2016). 
 56 Australian Competition & Consumer Comm‘n v Valve Corp. [No. 3], 2016 FCA 196, 1–2  
(Austl.). 
 57 Id. (The Court found that Valve made the following false or misleading representations to 
consumers, in the terms and conditions contained in three versions of its Steam Subscriber 
Agreement and two versions of its Steam Refund Policy). 
 58 Id. at 34. 
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D. SUMMARY AND REMARKS: OVERLAPS AND INTERACTIONS 
It is important to emphasize that any cloud service providers, 
users, and regulators, particularly for those who have to deal with cross-
country personal data transactions, need to carefully consider the three 
major challenges introduced above: (1) privacy and security; (2) 
jurisdiction; and (3) convergence. These three challenges are deeply 
interlinked, and certain overlaps may exist among the three. The overlaps 
and interactions between the three challenges provide evidence for and 
reflect upon the nature of integration and convergence in the information 
technology industry (―convergence challenge‖). 
III. RISE OF DATA LOCALIZATION MEASURE V. NEW REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) AGREEMENT 
A. RISE OF DATE LOCALIZATION MEASURES & THE RATIONALE BEHIND 
THE MEASURES 
In response to the growing number of legal challenges brought 
by CC, an increasing number of countries have introduced measures to 
control personal data flowing across their borders.59 Although the 
measures they adopted vary widely in both scope and intensity, a less 
contentious regulation that many countries adopt is a ―data localization‖ 
measure.60 Put simply, a data localization measure refers to any 
regulations or policies, which require companies to store and process 
data in data centers located physically within the national border.61 Many 
countries have included ―data localization‖ requirements into their legal 
frameworks in order to strengthen their controls of personal data flowing 
across their borders. These countries include TPP members, such as 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia (localization requirements for health 
records), and Canada (localization requirements for government data). In 
                                                     
 59 ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, DATA LOCALIZATION: A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL COMMERCE 
1, 6 (September 2015) (For example, ―In Brussels, officials have justified data localization as 
part of broader efforts by the European Union and national governments to regain control of 
information owned by U.S. multinational companies and subject to the prying eyes of the U.S. 
government.‖). 
 60 Neha Mishra, Data Localization Laws in a Digital World: Data Protection or Data 
Protectionism?, THE PUBLIC SPHERE 137, 137 (2016) (―Data localization policies are 
proliferating across both liberal/democratic states such as Australia, Canada, and India, as well as 
illiberal states such as China, Vietnam,. . . Iran [and] Russia.‖). 
 61 ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, supra note 59, at 3. 
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addition to non-TPP members, such as the European Union, Russia, and 
China, which are major trade partners to most TPP members.62 
Although the details, motivations, and scope of these measures 
are unique to each country, the rationales behind these measures are 
generally three-fold: first, to reduce the ―unpredictability‖ of data control 
and the uncertainty of law compliance brought by CC technology (as 
discussed above–technical reasons); second, and more importantly, to 
strengthen their data control ability in order to improve their international 
competitiveness in the global information economy; third, to address 
national security concerns through increased access and control of data 
that identifies potential threats. 
For example, EU officials in Brussels have justified data 
localization as part of broader efforts by the European Union and EU 
member governments to ―regain control of information owned by U.S. 
multinational companies and subject to the prying eyes of the U.S. 
government.‖63 Regarding the global information economy, in 2015, 
Gunther Oettinger, the EU Commissioner for the Digital Economy, 
explicitly expressed the EU‘s desire to wrest control of information from 
foreign entities, stating that, ―the Americans are in the lead, they‘ve got 
the data, the business models and so the power,‖ and the European Union 
needs ―stronger data-privacy safeguards to counter Google, Facebook, 
Apple and other U.S. companies offering Internet services and 
applications.‖64 In addition, political and national security justify the 
reason for data localization requirements. As Geist summarized, data 
localization requirements ―typically stem from mounting concerns over 
U.S. surveillance activities and the power granted to U.S. law 
enforcement under laws such as the USA Patriot Act.‖65 
By contrast, US commentators criticize complex compliance 
requirements in the EU, driven by recent court decisions and potential 
new regulations (e.g. the EU‘s General Data Protection Regulation 
                                                     
 62 Id. See also Data Localization Snapshot, INFO. TECH. INDUSTRY COUNCIL, 
https://www.itic.org/public-policy/SnapshotofDataLocalizationMeasures7-8-2016.pdf (last 
updated July 8, 2016). 
 63 ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, supra note 59, at 6. 
 64 Tom Fairless, Europe‘s Digital Czar Slams Google, Facebook, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Feb. 24, 2015, 9:54 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-digital-czar-slams-google-
facebook-over-selling-personal-data-1424789664. 
 65 Michael Geist, How the TPP Puts Canadian Privacy at Risk, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2015, 
5:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/michael-geist/tpp-canadian-privacy_b_8296146.html. 
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(GDPR)),66 which make an increasing number of foreign companies 
believe that in order to access the EU market, they ―have no choice but to 
relocate server infrastructure in Europe.‖67 In November 2015, Robert D. 
Atkinson, the President of the Information Technology and Innovation 
Fund, in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, stated that 
data flow restrictions imposed by other countries will harm the U.S. 
economy in at least two ways: 
First, requiring localization of data and servers will move activity 
from the United States to these nations, reducing jobs and investment 
here and raising costs for U.S. firms. 
Second, if the restrictions preclude U.S. firms from participating in 
foreign markets, then U.S. firms will lose global market share to 
competitors that are based in those protected markets.68 
Although it seems that the spread of data localization has 
become a ―global trend‖ and an increasingly popular legal method for 
strengthening the control and protection of personal information by both 
TPP and non-TPP countries (as mentioned above), such a trend may not 
be sustainable (at least to TPP members) due to the conclusion of the 
TPP Agreement negotiations led by the United States.69 Although it may 
not be the first trade agreement that reflects privacy and personal data 
concerns, it is the first agreement to contain detailed provisions on 
privacy and explicitly obligate members to ban data localization laws and 
policies. 
 
                                                     
 66 Council Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General data Protection 
Regulation), (L 119) 1 (EC). On 8 April 2016 the Council adopted the Regulation and the 
Directive. And on 14 April 2016 the Regulation and the Directive were adopted by the European 
Parliament. On 4 May 2016, the official texts of the Regulation and the Directive have been 
published in the EU Official Journal in all the official languages. While the Regulation will enter 
into force on 24 May 2016, it shall apply from 25 May 2018. The Directive enters into force on 5 
May 2016 and EU Member States have to transpose it into their national law by 6 May 2018. 
 67 ALBRIGHT STONEBRIDGE GROUP, supra note 59, at 6. 
 68 Internet Data Flows: Promoting Digital Trade in the 21st Century Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Interllectual Prop. and the Internet of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th 
Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of Robert D. Atkinson, Founder and President, The Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation). 
 69 Juro Osawa & Eva Dou, China‘s Top Web Browsers Leave User Data Vulnerable, Group Says, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-web-browsers-
leave-user-data-vulnerable-group-says-1459198802 (quoting Manuel Maisog). 
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B. NEW REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT 
After more than five years of negotiation, the TPP finally 
reached a successful conclusion on October 6, 2015.70 The TPP 
negotiations were undertaken by twelve countries from both sides of the 
Pacific (including Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam) 
that together represent 40 percent of the global GDP.71 
The TPP is the largest regional free trade agreement to date.72 
Apart from reducing trade barriers and offering new market access and 
investment opportunities, the TPP contains a special chapter on 
Electronic Commerce (―e-commerce‖ chapter), which ensures that trade 
conducted electronically between TPP countries takes place efficiently 
and with appropriate consumer protections.73 For the first time, it 
explicitly obligates the member countries to (1) protect personal data, 
together with a commitment to (2) the freedom of cross-border data, and 
(3) information flows. 
1. Three obligations on personal data protection 
a. Protection of Personal Information 
As the bedrock provision on the personal data protection, Article 
14.8 of the TPP explicitly requires each member state to set up a ―legal 
framework‖ for providing sufficient protection of the ―electronic 
commerce‖ users.74 Since a ―legal framework‖ is required, this is clearly 
an advance on the APEC Privacy Framework (2004), which is not 
legally binding to its parties.75 While recognizing that each member state 
may adopt different legal approaches to protect personal information, the 
TPP obligates member states to encourage the development of 
                                                     
 70 TPP, supra note 3. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at art. 14.7. 
 74 Id. at art. 14.8(2). 
 75 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Privacy Framework, APEC Doc. No. 205-
SO-01.2 (2005). 
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mechanisms or arrangements in order to ―promote compatibility between 
various approaches.‖76 
To increase compatibility, the TPP, for the first time, provides a 
clear and broad definition of ―personal information,‖ to mean, ―any 
information, including data, about an identified or identifiable natural 
person.‖77 This definition is a well-accepted approach to defining 
personal data and is similar to the position of major non-TPP economies, 
such as the European Union (EU). The new EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) 2016 defines that ―‗personal data‘ means any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‗data 
subject‘).‖78 
All member states, with the exception of Brunei and Vietnam, 
which are in the process of implementing their respective ―legal 
frameworks,‖ have already established legal frameworks that provide for 
the protection of personal data.79 As such, the TPP has taken an important 
step by attempting to enhance the harmonization of personal data 
protection rules and the enforcement of personal data protection rules in 
both TPP and non-TPP countries. It may still be too early, however, to 
conclude that the TPP has increased the level of personal data protection 
at the international level (more details will be discussed later). 
b. Cross-Border Transfers of Personal Data (Prohibition on Data Export 
Limitations) 
The TPP contains a provision, which specifically deals with 
cross-border data transfers by electronic means.80 While recognizing that 
―each member state may have its own regulatory requirements 
concerning the transfer of information by electronic means,‖ Article 
14.11 obliges each member state to ―allow the cross-border transfer of 
information by electronic means, including personal information, when 
                                                     
 76 TPP, supra note 3, at arts. 14.8.2 n.6, 14.8.5 (The TPP allows a member state to comply with the 
obligation under Art 14.8.2 ―by adopting or maintaining measures such as a comprehensive 
privacy, personal information or personal data protection laws, sector-specific laws covering 
privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of voluntary undertakings by enterprises 
relating to privacy‖). 
 77 Id. at art. 14.1 (Definitions). 
 78 Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 66. 
 79 See TPP, supra note 3, at art 14.8 n.5 (―Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam are not required to 
apply [Article 14.8] before the date on which that Party implements its legal framework that 
provides for the protection of personal data of the users of electronic commerce.‖). 
 80 Id. at art. 14.11. 
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this activity is for the conduct of the business . . .‖81 In comparison with 
the general protection provision under Art. 14.8, which only applies to 
the protection of the ―users of electronic commerce‖ personal data, the 
scope of application of Art. 14.11 is much wider.82 It covers all ―cross-
border transfer of information by electronic means.‖83 Article 14.11 not 
only covers the transfer of commercial data (such as customers‘ credit 
card information), but also non-commercial data, such as the personal 
information of patients in a hospital or the personal information of 
employees in a company.84 
The TPP also allows safe harbor (immunity) for member 
governments to impose conditions or restrictions on the ―cross-border 
transfer of information‖ in certain circumstances.85 More specifically, in 
order to obtain the immunity, such conditions or restrictions must satisfy 
four requirements: 
The measures ―are required to achieve a legitimate public policy 
objective‖ (public objective exemption);86 
The measures are not applied in a manner that would ―constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination;‖87 or 
The measures are not applied in a manner that would ―constitute a 
disguised restriction on trade;‖88 
The measures are not applied in a manner that would ―impose 
restrictions on transfers of information greater than are required to 
achieve the objective.‖89 
If a TPP member fails to meet any one of four requirements, the 
country‘s data export restrictions could face dispute settlement 
proceedings (more details will be discussed below). Additionally, the 
TPP leaves the onus on the member government imposing a restriction to 
prove its policy measure satisfies all four requirements.90 Through these 
                                                     
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at art. 14.8. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at art. 14.11. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at art. 14.11.2. 
 87 Id. at art. 14.11.3(a). 
 88 TPP Chapter Summary: Electronic Commerce, AUSTL. GOV‘T DEP‘T OF FOREIGN AFF. & 
TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/summaries/Documents/electronic-
commerce.PDF (last updated July 12, 2016); TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.11.3(a). 
 89 Id. at art. 14.11.3(b). 
 90 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
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provisions, for the first time, the TPP provides businesses with certainty 
about their ability to move data across borders.91 
c. Freedom of data flows (Prohibition on data localization) 
The TPP Agreement contains a prohibition provision on data 
localization.92 Art. 14.13 (Location of Computing Facilities) explicitly 
prevents localization of ―computer servers and storage devices for 
processing or storing information for commercial use,‖ and obligates 
each member state not to implement any measures which require 
companies ―to use or locate computing facilities in that [member state‘s] 
territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory.‖93 In 
other words, any TPP member cannot impose requirements on a covered 
person to use or build a local data center (computing facilities) in order 
to conduct business in that TPP member‘s territory. 
Nevertheless, in the same manner as the cross-border transfers of 
personal data provisions, the TPP still allows member states to introduce 
localization requirements for the purpose of achieving public policy 
objectives.94 In order to justify the application of data localization 
measures, a member must prove that the localization measures satisfy 
four requirements: the measures are adopted or maintained ―to achieve a 
legitimate public policy objective‖ (public objective exemption);95 the 
measures are not applied in a manner that would ―constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination;‖96 or the measures are not 
applied in a manner that would ―constitute a disguised restriction on 
trade;‖97 the measures are not applied in a manner that would ―impose 
restrictions on the use or location of computing facilities greater than 
are required to achieve the objective.‖98 
                                                     
 91 Id. at 12. 
 92 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.13. 
 93 Id. at art. 14.13.2. 
 94 Id. at arts. 14.13.2, 14.13.3(a)–(b) (public objectives exemption). 
 95 Id. at art. 14.13.3. 
 96 Id. at art. 14.13.3(a). 
 97 TPP Chapter Summary: Electronic Commerce, supra note 88; TPP, supra note 3, art. 14.13.3(a). 
 98 Id. at art. 14.13.3. (―Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining 
measures inconsistent with paragraph 2 to achieve a legitimate public policy objective, provided 
that the measure: (a) is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade; and (b) does not impose 
restrictions on the use or location of computing facilities greater than are required to achieve the 
objective.‖); Id. at art. 14.13.3(a). 
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Like the counterparts for data export limitation immunity, if a 
TPP member fails to meet any one of the four requirements, its data 
localization measures could face dispute settlement proceedings. Again, 
the TPP leaves the onus to member governments imposing data 
localization measures to prove its policy measures satisfy all four 
requirements.99 
The introduction of the data localization prohibition provisions 
provide security to businesses that are making substantial investment 
decisions relating to the placement of data centers in TPP countries, and 
may significantly reduce market entry barriers between TPP countries.100 
It is not surprising that data localization measures are limited and can 
even be explicitly prohibited (subject to public objective exemption) by 
the TPP Agreement, since the TPP negotiation was initiated and oriented 
by the United States, which has suffered from the localization provisions 
of the EU personal data protection laws for a long time. It seems that the 
United States intends to use the TPP agreement to prevent future TPP 
members from making EU-style data localization legislation. 
2. Dual Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
There are two sets of dispute settlement mechanisms under the 
TPP. First, it obligates the member countries to adopt an investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism under Chapter 9 Investment.101 It 
potentially applies whenever an investor from one member country 
makes an investment in the territory of the other member country.102 
ISDS enables an investor, who believes a TPP member government has 
breached its investment obligations, and whose attempts at resolution 
have failed, to take the matter to arbitration for possible compensation.103 
Arbitration would happen under rules administered by a respected 
international arbitration bodies selected by involved parties.104 The TTP 
requires that the proceedings would be open and transparent,105 and the 
                                                     
 99 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 11. 
 100 Id. 
 101 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 9 (Investment). 
 102 Id. at art. 9.2. 
 103 Id. at art. 9.19. 
 104 Id. at art. 19.19.5. 
 105 Id. at art. 9.24. 
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arbitrators would be independent.106 Second, the TPP contains a special 
chapter called Dispute Settlement.107 Unlike ISDS, the Dispute Settlement 
Chapter governs disputes between governments of TPP members, rather 
than disputes between private parties and governments.108 In case that all 
other attempts have failed, Chapter 28 allows all TPP members to have 
disputes resolved by arbitration. 
The scope of the application of these two dispute settlement 
mechanisms are different. The ISDS mechanism applies exclusively to 
commitments in the investment chapter and relates to disputes between 
private parties and governments.109 Article 9.6.3 of TPP explicitly 
elucidates, ―[A] determination that there has been a breach of another 
provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, 
does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article.‖110 
Therefore, it seems that a breach by a member country of any provision 
that is not relevant to ―investment‖ (e.g. the provisions in relation to 
personal data protection), will not automatically trigger the entitlement of 
affected companies to the ISDS provisions unless the affected companies 
can prove otherwise. By contrast, the dispute settlement mechanism 
(under Chapter 28) generally applies across the TPP Agreement, 
whenever one member considers that another member‘s ―actual or 
proposed measure‖ does not comply with its obligations under the 
TPP.111 So naturally, these procedures between states (under Chapter 28) 
                                                     
 106 Id. at art. 9.22. Most respected international arbitration bodies have an ‗independence‘ 
requirement to select arbitrators. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 14, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; Int‘l 
Centre for Settlement of Inv. Dispute [ICSID], Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, art. 7, ICSID/11 (Apr. 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf (requiring  
arbitrators  to  be  ―persons of  high  moral  character  [with]  recognized competence  in  the  
fields  of  law,  commerce,  industry  or  finance,  who  may  be relied  upon  to  exercise  
independent  judgment.‖). See also G.A. Res. 68/109 Arbitration Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, arts. 9–12 (Dec. 16, 2013) (requiring  arbitrators  to  be  
impartial and  independent , and  to disclose  anything  likely  to  give  rise  to  justifiable  doubts  
as  to  the  arbitrator‘s impartiality or independence). Arseni Matveev, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: The Evolving Balance Between Investor Protection and State Sovereignty, 40 U. OF 
W. AUSTL. L. REV. 348, 353 (2015). 
 107 TPP, supra note 3, at ch. 28 (Dispute Settlement). 
 108 Id. 
 109 ―A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a 
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article.‖ 
Id. at art. 9.6.3. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at art. 28.7–.9. 
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will apply to any dispute concerning the Electronic Commerce 
provisions (including personal data protection provisions) under Article 
14.112 
C. NEW TENDENCY – WITHDRAWING FROM TPP 
The increasing tendency of prospective or established member 
states to consider not proceeding with or even withdrawing from the TPP 
is noteworthy. In many countries, but particularly in the United States 
support for the TPP has waned for various reasons. In the United States, 
the TPP trade deal faced opposition from the 2016 presidential 
candidates in both major parties. Indeed, both Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump opposed the deal, arguing that it will hurt American 
workers.113 Clinton contended she would only support the TPP trade deal 
as president if the agreement were revised in some way.114 Going further, 
Trump promised withdrawal of the United States from the TPP.115 
In Australia, the Coalition has been very active in negotiating 
free trade agreements, and the Labor Party has a policy of open trade.116 
But an increasing number of political parties or politicians have started to 
oppose the TPP. For example, Senator Nick Xenophon and his party 
(NXT) have been vocal in their criticism of the TPP and called for a 
more strategic and ―hard-headed‖ approach to trade negotiations to 
protect Australian workers.117 The Greens Party has been highly against 
the TPP for many years and has called for withdrawing from the TPP.118 
The Greens expressed strong concerns on the ISDS provisions. They 
                                                     
 112 Id. at art. 14.7. 
 113 Stephen Greenhouse, Hillary Clinton‘s TPP Deal Disapproval is ‗A Critical Turning Point, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Oct. 8, 2016). 
 114 Eric Bradner, Clinton‘s TPP Controversy: What You Need to Know, CNN.COM (July 27, 2016) 
at http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/27/politics/tpp-what-you-need-to-know/ (Clinton said she 
opposes the TPP because of its lack of a crackdown on currency manipulation and provisions to 
extend pharmaceutical drug companies‘ patent protections in poorer countries.). 
 115 Jeremy Diamond, Trump Slams Globalization, Promises to Upend Economic Status Quo, 
CNN.COM (June 28, 2016, 20:51 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/28/politics/donald-
trump-speech-pennsylvania-economy/. 
 116 Paul Kiren et al., The Free Trade Mythology of Added Prosperity, THE AUSTL., (Aug. 24, 2016). 
 117 Anna Vidot, What Could Australia‘s More Trade-Sceptic Senate Mean for the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership?, ABC RURAL (July 5, 2016) (―In response to being called a ‗protectionist‘, Senator 
Xenophon said he would wear the description as a badge of honour for ‗standing up for 
Australian manufacturing industry and the jobs of Australian workers‘‖). 
 118 Australian Greens Party, Stop the TPP: The Biggest Trade Deal in our History is Far Worse 
Than Expected, http://greens.org.au/campaigns/national/stop-tpp (last visited Nov. 12, 2016). 
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believe that the ISDS provisions, ―will allow foreign investors to sue our 
government if their profits are affected by any Australian law or 
policy.‖119 
It is clear that the vitality of the TPP regime is still questionable. 
Particularly, it is unclear whether existing TPP members will still 
proceed if the United States formally withdraws from the TPP. Member 
countries may stay or withdraw from the TPP for various reasons (not 
limited to privacy and e-commerce reasons). Next, this paper will 
examine potential impacts of the TPP on personal data protection, 
including both the opportunities and the risks of joining or withdrawing 
from the TPP. 
IV. IMPLICATION OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF 
THE TPP ON BUSINESSES 
A. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS: THE LINK BETWEEN PRIVACY AND TRADE 
Historically, privacy has not been an issue typically associated 
with trade agreements. While some former FTAs contain certain personal 
data related provisions, they mainly focus on freedom of data flows 
only.120  It seems for the first time, however, that the TPP is attempting to 
establish a formal link between privacy and trade through very detailed 
provisions relating to personal data protection (under Chapter 14),121 in a 
similar manner to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreements 
(TRIPS Agreement)122 under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
framework.123 More importantly, like the WTO, the TPP also contains 
dispute settlement mechanisms, under Chapter 9 Investment and Chapter 
28 Dispute Settlement respectively.124 Due to these dispute settlement 
mechanisms, it is likely that there will be an increase in the 
enforceability of privacy provisions under the TPP.125 As the first 
                                                     
 119 Id. 
 120 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 3–7 (for specific examples, please see the section on ―FTAs and 
privacy prior to 2015‘s TPP‖). 
 121 Id. at 2. 
 122 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 123 Id. 
 124 TPP, supra note 3, at ch. 18 (Intellectual Property). 
 125 This paper will not focus on the international dispute resolution mechanisms in relation to cross 
border data protection. The author will discuss this issue in a separate paper. 
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international trade agreement which contains both detailed privacy 
requirements and dual dispute settlement mechanisms, the TPP will have 
profound implications on future international privacy lawmaking (More 
details will be discussed in the recommendation section). 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS UNDER 
TPP: OPPORTUNITY AND RISKS 
The TPP data protection provision offers both substantial 
opportunities and risk. 
1. Potential Opportunities 
First, as mentioned above, data protection provisions under the 
TPP have arguably created the potential for member states to harmonize 
their personal data protection laws Asia Pacific-wide (APAC-wide). 
Second, the TPP helps reduce the cost of compliance with the law. As 
such, it reduces the cost of business operations across a ―patchwork‖ of 
national data protection laws that regulate the collecting or processing 
personal data in member states, and the cross-border personal data 
transfers between member states.126 
By adopting a more uniform approach and concerted effort 
towards the personal data protection, TPP will arguably help to build 
trust and confidence between businesses and consumers in TPP markets. 
More specifically, businesses will have the freedom and flexibility to 
store and process personal data across different TPP markets. For 
example, a large cloud service provider will be able to rely on economies 
of scale to serve multiple TPP markets using computing and data storage 
facilities (e.g. data centers) from fewer locations. They do not need to 
worry about the data localization rules of other member states, and do 
not need to build or invest in their data infrastructures in each TPP 
market that the business seeks to serve.127 
                                                     
 126 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.11. See also Jack Ow, The Trans-Pacific Partnership‘s Take on 
Personal Data (Dec. 2015), https://www.taylorwessing.com/globaldatahub/article-the-tpp-take-
on-personal-data.html. 
 127 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.11. 
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2. Limits & Potential Risks 
Although the TPP has enhanced the harmonization and 
enforcement of personal data protection rules, it is too early to conclude 
that it has increased the level of protection of personal data among TPP 
and non-TPP countries. 
First, it seems that the provisions in relation to the privacy of 
citizens of TPP members are too weak and some key terms remain not 
clearly defined.128 For example, Article 14.8.2 explicitly requires that 
when developing a ―legal framework‖ the framework must include 
provisions protecting ―the personal information of the users of electronic 
commerce,‖ and provides that each member should ―take into account 
principles and guidelines of relevant international bodies.‖129 Here, the 
issue is that the legal framework presented only applies to ―users of 
electronic commerce,‖ and therefore member states may argue that the 
framework will not apply to all private sector activities (even if 
commercial). If so, it will not apply to categories of private sector 
personal data (such as personal information of employee). The scope of 
personal data protection requirements is thus, too narrow.130 
Moreover, the TPP does not mention any specific international 
instruments that member countries should follow. Neither does it provide 
a list of principles for members in order to protect personal data nor are 
any specific enforcement measures mentioned in the TPP. As a 
consequence, these personal data protection requirements become less 
enforceable in practice as it is hard for a company or a member to 
challenge the TPP compliance of other members. 
By contrast, as discussed above, the TPP contains detailed 
provisions to prohibit data export limitations and data localization rules 
of member states. In comparison with privacy protection provisions, 
these data export and data localization provisions are definitive and much 
more like to be enforced.131 The implications of the data export 
limitations and data localization provisions for TPP members could 
mainly benefit cloud-service net exporting countries, particularly the 
United States by removing those barriers to the data flow through the 
                                                     
 128  See, e.g., id. at art. 14.8.2 for the meaning of ―relevant international bodies.‖ 
 129  Id. 
 130  See also Greenleaf, supra note 4. 
 131  Greenleaf identifies certain exemptions for privacy limitation provisions in the TPP but 
concludes that they are similarly difficult to enforce. Id. 
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TPP.132 The provisions would instead, transfer the risks to cloud service 
net importing countries, such as Australia, Canada, and most of 
developing country members under the TPP. 
The TPP allows U.S. cloud service providers to bypass the TPP 
members‘ data localization laws to keep cloud users‘ personal 
information on servers in the United States rather than on local servers in 
other TPP countries, such as in Australia and Canada.133 This will 
perhaps deliver an economic advantage to U.S. data storage companies. 
The ability for US companies to bypass data localization laws may result 
in both economic and privacy risks for other countries. In particular, this 
may open the door to further surveillance. As Professor Geist noted, ―the 
combined effect of these U.S. laws is that many users fear that once their 
information is stored in the U.S., it will be accessible to U.S. authorities 
without suitable privacy protections or oversight.‖134 In fact, even U.S. 
cloud service providers may share such concerns. In January 2016, 
Amazon, one of the largest cloud service providers in the world, 
announced its plans to establish Canadian-based data centers in order to 
―address mounting fears over the privacy and surveillance implications 
of information stored in the U.S.‖135 
Moreover, the data localization provision (location of computing 
facilities) could target TPP members‘ efforts to stop transferring personal 
data to states with inadequate privacy protections.136 On October 6, 2015, 
in Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems 
case), the European Court of Justice issued a landmark ruling that an 
agreement between the EU and the United States on data sharing, 
specifically the safe harbor privacy principles137 is invalid due to 
                                                     
 132  U.S. TRADE REP., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: PROMOTING DIGITAL TRADE (FACT 
SHEET). 
 133 Both Australia and Canada has data localization requirement.  See Data Localization Snapshot, 
supra note 62, at 1. 
 134 Geist, supra note 65. 
 135 Michael Geist, Thanks to TPP, Canada Could Get Caught in Global Privacy Battle, THE TYEE 
(Jan. 19, 2016), http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2016/01/19/TPP-Global-Privacy-Battle/ (stating this 
―highlights how businesses and consumers have become increasingly concerned with where their 
data is transferred and stored.‖). 
 136 Geist, supra note 65. 
 137 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe 
Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US 
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7. See also Graham Greenleaf, International Data 
Privacy Agreements After the GDPR and Schrems, 139 PRIV. L. & BUS. INT‘L REP. 12, 12–15 
(2016). 
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concerns over surveillance activities by United States authorities.138 The 
EU court can reach such a decision because it is not a member of the 
TPP agreement. It is unlikely that a similar decision could be made by 
any TPP countries due to the effects of the data localization prohibition 
provisions. Although an increasing number of countries (e.g. EU 
countries) and businesses (e.g. Amazon) have begun to embrace 
restrictions on data transfers solely to states with adequate personal data 
protection, the TPP Agreement could possibly restrict its member states‘ 
ability to do the same.139 
C: IMPLICATION OF DUAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS ON 
CROSS-BORDER DATA PROTECTION 
1. Implications to Investors 
The TPP provides a greater level of security for investors, but 
does not render ―indirect expropriation of the investment‖ impossible.140 
The TPP‘s dual-dispute settlement mechanism would arguably have 
significant impacts on the investors operating in TPP member states. 
More specifically, it allows a company in TPP member countries to have 
more options—such as, have two ways to defend its rights under the 
TPP: ISDS (Chapter 9) and dispute settlement (Chapter 28).141 Cross-
border personal data protection seems to be the direct focus of the ISDS 
mechanism as Article 9.6.3 of the TPP explicitly limits the application of 
ISDS to breach the investment-related provisions under Chapter 9.142 
Regardless, there are still some possibilities for a company to defend its 
rights under Chapter 14 (in relation to personal data protection) by 
referring to relevant provisions under Chapter 9 (in relation to the ISDS). 
For example, as one commentator noted, if a company in one TTP 
country (e.g. a company in Country A) is not satisfied with the data 
localization law or policy in another TPP country (Country B), it could 
claim that Country B has breached the data export limitation or data 
localization provisions under Chapter 14 of the TPP, and this would 
                                                     
 138 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm‘r, 2015 O.J.  (C 398) 5 (Ir.). 
 139 Geist, supra note 65. 
 140 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 13. 
 141 TPP, supra note 3. 
 142 Id. 
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constitute an ―indirect expropriation of the investment‖ under Chapter 9 
Investment, and, therefore, the ISDS regime will apply.143 
It is also noteworthy that the combined effects of the ISDS and 
the ―most favoured nation (MFN) clause‖ (i.e. a method of establishing 
equality of trading opportunity among states by guaranteeing that if one 
country is given better trade terms by another, then all other states must 
get the same terms) in the TPP will enable a company from any other 
TPP countries to make a claim against a TPP member country based on 
the ISDS provisions in any other trade agreement such a member country 
has signed, no matter which country (including non-TPP countries) it 
was signed with.144 As such, the ISDS possibilities may arguably frighten 
any TPP member that has laws regarding personal data but a relatively 
smaller litigation budget than Google or Facebook.145 
Relating to the implication of disputed settlement mechanism 
(under Chapter 28), cross-border personal data protection is clearly not 
the sole focus of the mechanism, and Chapter 28 applies to any breach of 
TPP provisions.146 Therefore, any breach of cross-border data transfer 
provisions under Chapter 14 would arguably be covered by such a 
mechanism. It is significant that, if a company would like to benefit from 
this mechanism, it needs to get the support from its government since 
Chapter 28 only applies to the disputes between member states. 
2. Implications to Governments 
The potential impacts of dispute settlement systems should not 
be overstated. Although the TPP contains a dual-dispute settlement 
mechanism, this does not necessarily mean TPP member countries have 
to face more disputes in relation to personal data protection. As 
introduced above, the ISDS mechanism applies exclusively to 
commitments relating to investment. A breach of any provision, which is 
not relevant to ―investment,‖ will not automatically trigger an ISDS 
proceeding. In other words, to trigger an ISDS proceeding, the applicant 
will need to provide sufficient evidence to show the breach of personal 
data provisions will result in a breach of member‘s ―investment‖ 
commitments under Chapter 9. 
                                                     
 143 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 13. 
 144 Australian Greens Party, supra note 118. 
 145 Id. 
 146 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 28 (Dispute Settlement). 
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Although some people are concerned that the ISDS may give 
foreign investors the right to seek compensation from a TTP member‘s 
government, in practice, even if it is an actual breach of the TPP 
investment obligations, member countries may still be able to avoid 
ISDS proceedings on various grounds. For example, member 
governments may justify their data localization policy or law with 
―legitimate public policy reasons,‖ such as privacy protection, national 
security, and anti-terrorism.147 Therefore, so long as a TTP member‘s 
government can provide evidence that it acts in good faith, for legitimate 
public policy reasons, and follows a proper process and national 
treatment principle, the risk of an ISDS case being taken is very low.148 
Furthermore, based on a study conducted by the New Zealand 
government, over the past three decades, New Zealand has had ISDS 
provisions in international agreements with different countries, including 
the NZ-China Free Trade Agreement (2008), but no case has ever been 
taken against it.149 In Australia, based on the data provided by the 
Australian government, Australia has signed 28 trade agreements with an 
ISDS provision, but there has been just one ISDS challenge brought 
against Australia.150 Tobacco company, Philip Morris, used an ISDS 
provision in a Hong Kong-Australia Investment Agreement (1993)151 to 
sue the Australian government because of the Australian Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Act 201. On May 17, 2016 the arbitration tribunal published 
the decision; the tribunal concluded the arbitration in Australia‘s favor, 
and found that Philip Morris Asia‘s claim was an abuse of process (abuse 
of rights).152 This was the first and only ISDS dispute brought against 
Australia over the past three decades, and Australia won. 
Moreover, in a recent study conducted by the Canadian Center 
for Policy Alternatives in 2015, researchers found that 77 investor-state 
claims were filed through the NAFTA ISDS system over the past two 
                                                     
 147 NEW ZEALAND GOV‘T, TPP: IN BRIEF, FACT SHEET (N.Z.) 6 (OCT. 2015), 
https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/all/files/TPP-Q&A-Oct-2015.pdf. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Investor-State Dispute Settlement, AUSTL. GOV‘T DEP‘T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/pages/isds.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
 151 Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, 1748 U.N.T.S. 385. 
 152 Tobacco Plain Packaging—Investor-State Arbitration, AUSTL. GOV‘T ATT‘Y-GEN.‘S DEP‘T, 
https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
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decades.153 Canada has been the target of 35 investor-state claims, 
significantly more than either Mexico (22 claims) or the U.S. (20 
claims). Among 35 cases, so far, only three cases have been decided 
against Canada.154As such, the risk for potential ISDS disputes should not 
be overstated. 
D. LIMITED IMPACTS & EXEMPTIONS: LIMITED BY THE NUMBER OF 
MEMBER COUNTRIES & INTERNET USERS 
In terms of cross border data transfer, the influence of the TPP 
(including both positive and negative impacts) should not be overstated. 
The TPP has not resolved existing legal challenges relating to cross-
border data protection (discussed in Section II), nor has it created any 
extra challenges which may substantially change the current landscape of 
personal data protection laws worldwide. In addition, neither the positive 
impacts of detailed privacy protection provisions nor the negative 
impacts of the data localization prohibition provisions on offshore 
personal data protection should be overstated. The impacts of these 
provisions have been significantly limited by the member coverage of the 
TPP Agreement. These provisions only apply to twelve TPP member 
states.155 
Although these twelve states represent about fourty percent of 
the world GDP, there is no evidence that shows they also represent a 
high percentage of world data flow, which is highly relevant to the 
enforcement of the laws in relation to cross-border data protection.156 By 
contrast, based on the data provided by the Internet Live Stats on May 8, 
2016, the top ten countries on the list of ―number of Internet users‖ are: 
China, India, United States, Brazil, Japan, Russian, Nigeria, Germany, 
United Kingdom, and Mexico.157 Only three of them are TPP member 
states.158 
                                                     
 153 SCOTT SINCLAIR, CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 29–30 (Jan. 1, 2015), 
https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/201
5/01/NAFTA_Chapter11_Investor_State_Disputes_2015.pdf. 
 154 Id. at 29. 
 155 TPP, supra note 3. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Internet Users by Country (2016), INTERNET LIVE STATS, 
http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ (last visited May 8, 2016). 
 158 NEW ZEALAND GOV‘T, supra note 147, at 1. 
TIAN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:34 PM 
Vol. 34, No. 2  Join or Withdraw 401 
Many major economies (non-TPP states but representing a high 
percentage of internet users), such as the EU, China, and Russia, have all 
adopted data localization measures in promoting data control.159 It does 
not seem that the TPP can ―reverse the trend‖ of data localization. For 
personal data protection concerns, either joining or withdrawing from the 
TPP does not greatly impact the current landscape of privacy protection 
in the cyberspace, including existing challenges brought by cloud 
computing technology. 
E. SUMMARY AND REMARKS: RATIONALE BEHIND & JOIN OR 
WITHDRAW 
In 2016, Professor Graham provided a fine summary of the 
potential effects of TPP on the protection of the privacy of citizens: 
TPP seems to be the type of binding international privacy treaty that 
the USA (in particular) wishes to achieve. For the other states whose 
personal data will be ‗hoovered up‘, it is more likely to be a Faustian 
bargain: put at risk the protection of the privacy of your citizens 
(except at home) in return for the golden chalice of trade 
liberalisation. If the TPP is defeated in the US Congress, this will be 
a net gain for privacy protection, whatever one thinks about the other 
potential economic advantages of the TPP.160 
As discussed above, the TPP does not have substantive or 
concrete requirements to protect the privacy of citizens of member 
states.161 By contrast, it contains detailed provisions to prohibit data 
export limitations or data localization rules in member states.162 
The rationale behind this policy decision can easily be identified. 
The TPP essentially is a ―trade‖ agreement in nature. Accordingly, its 
main focus is how to strike a trade-off of the economic interests of 
member states rather than on the equity and justice issues relating to 
personal data protection. Although it is the first legally binding 
agreement that provides detailed provisions relating to privacy and 
personal data protection, it has been highly influenced by the national 
economic interests of major members. Therefore, people should not have 
unrealistic expectations of its impacts on the enhancement and 
harmonization of personal data protection laws in various countries. 
                                                     
 159 Mishra, supra note 60, at 139. 
 160 Professor Graham Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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Regarding the question whether a country should join or 
withdraw from the TPP, as discussed, eventually, it seems that this is 
mainly an economic and political question rather than a citizen rights and 
privacy law question. For most countries, it is simply a trade-off of 
economic interests in different industrial sectors, including a trade-off of 
personal data protection (open digital market by banning data 
localization rules) and concessions for other industry sectors from other 
TPP countries (open agriculture market for example). 
Using Intellectual property as an example, most of FTAs contain 
a special chapter on intellectual property (IP).163 Like many other FTAs, 
the IP Chapter of the Australia-US FTA (2005) explicitly requires 
Australia to extend the term of copyright protection to the author‘s 
lifetime plus 70 years (it was 50 years).164 This requirement is certainly 
positive for the United States, since the United States is a copyright net 
exporting country. As a copyright net importing country, however, 
Australia does not have any strong incentive to extend the copyright 
term. Nevertheless, in order to obtain concessions in other industry 
sectors from other TPP members (the agriculture sector, for example) 
Australia eventually agreed to extend its copyright term for another 20 
years. It is same for personal data protection provisions under the TPP. 
There is no incentive for any cloud service net importing countries to ban 
data localization rules, but they have to accept these provisions in order 
to get access to the markets of other cloud service exporting countries. 
Like IP protection, personal data protection is only one of bargaining 
tools of TPP and other FTA negotiations. 
Additionally, although the TPP was successfully concluded, the 
text of the TPP is still subject to the process of legal review, translation, 
and verification within each member state. It is generally accepted this 
should be accomplished within 2 years. It would be interesting to see 
whether TPP members will still be incentivized to proceed with the 
ratification of the TPP, particularly, if the United States eventually 
decides to withdraw from TPP. 
                                                     
 163 YIJUN TIAN, RE-THINKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL ERA 48–56 (2009). 
 164 See Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 17.4(4), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 
1248, http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australia-united-states-free-trade-
agreement/Documents/Final_text_ausfta.pdf. 
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V. FUTURE HARMONIZATION - INSIGHTS FROM TPP 
Although the vitality of TPP regime is still unclear, and the 
personal data protection regime under the TPP is full of problems and 
remains far from perfect, it does provide some insights for future 
regulators to harmonize international laws on personal data protection 
and cross-border data flows. 
A. CONTENT 
In terms of the content of the TPP, first, it provides insight on the 
necessity of unifying legal terms in relation to personal data protection. 
As mentioned above, the TPP (Art 14.1) provides clear definitions on 
some key terms in relation to cross-border data protection, such as 
―computing facilities,‖ ―digital product,‖ ―electronic transmission,‖ and 
―personal information.‖165 Different countries have different laws 
regarding personal data protection. Even within a particular country, 
regulations or industrial rules issued by different authorities could 
conflict.166 Therefore, as a starting point for law harmonization, it is an 
important for all member states to have consensus on the meanings and 
coverage of some key legal terms in relation of personal data protection. 
Second, through detailed provisions on personal data protection 
in a legally binding international treaty (as introduced above), the TPP 
actually sets up minimum standards for member states to safeguard 
personal information/data and ensure the freedom of cross-border data 
transfer.167 This may enhance the personal data protection enforcement 
among all member states, and provides the legal certainty that businesses 
require to operate in the TPP market. 
B. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM & ENFORCEABILITY 
In regards to enforcement, the TPP contains a dual dispute 
settlement mechanism (under Chapter 9 Investment and Chapter 28 
                                                     
 165 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.1. 
 166 For example, the definition of ‗personal information‘ could be different under different law 
and/or ministerial rules in China. See also Graham Greenleaf & George Tian, China Expands 
Data Protection Through 2013 Guidelines: A ―Third Line‖ for Personal Information Protection, 
with a Translation of the Guidelines, 122 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT‘L REP. 1, 2–6 (2013). 
 167 Greenleaf, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
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Dispute Settlement).168 This provides insight on the effective enforcement 
of personal data protection laws at the international level. Again, using 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) as a point of comparison, the history of 
the international protection of IPRs evidenced the significant impact of 
dispute settlement systems on effective law enforcement. In the 1990s, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) had an inherent 
institutional deficiency in enforcing the treaties that it oversaw.169 The 
introduction of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) under the WTO framework 
significantly enhanced international enforcement.170 This is mainly 
because Part V of the TRIPS, outlines mandatory dispute settlement 
procedures and requires that all disputes arising under the Agreement be 
―settled by the WTO dispute settlement process.‖171 
A similar approach can be applied to the possibility of effective 
international enforcement of personal data protection laws. Like the 
enforcement IPRs in the 1990s, the extent of privacy/personal data 
protection and enforcement now varies widely in different nations.172 The 
absence of an effective international enforcement mechanism is possibly 
one of main reasons. By including detailed personal data protection 
provisions in the TPP (which contain a dual dispute settlement regime), it 
seems that the United States is attempting to apply a TRIPS strategy (or 
an IPR international enforcement strategy) to the international 
enforcement of privacy laws. This approach certainly lends insights for 
future international privacy law making. 
C. BALANCE OF INTERESTS & FLEXIBILITIES 
In terms of the flexibility and balance of interests of various 
stakeholders, as introduced above, the TPP contains some useful 
exemptions for various industries. It also provides specific exemptions 
for the implementation of the prohibition provision on data exports 
limitations,173 and data localization,174 in order to minimize any 
                                                     
 168 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 18 (Intellectual Property). 
 169 TIAN, supra note 163, at 27. 
 170 TRIPS, supra note 122, at arts. 63–64. 
 171 See id. See also, TIAN, supra note 163, at 31. 
 172 See generally GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS: TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVES (2014) (providing many fine examples of the various methods of data protection 
and enforcement). 
 173  TPP, supra note 3, at art.14.11. 
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unnecessary interventions of operations of existing personal data 
protection laws in member states175 
Additionally, it seems that the TPP is attempting to adopt a 
WTO-style ―Special and differential treatment provisions‖ to respond to 
the interest of developing countries.176 For example, relating to the 
application of dispute settlement provisions, Article 14.18 (Dispute 
Settlement) explicitly states: 
1. Malaysia shall not be subject to dispute settlement under Chapter 
28 (Dispute Settlement) regarding its obligations under Article 14.4 
(Non-Discriminatory Treatment of Digital Products) and Article 
14.11 (Cross-Border Transfer of Information by Electronic Means) 
for a period of two years after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement for Malaysia. 
2. Viet Nam shall not be subject to dispute settlement under Chapter 
28 (Dispute Settlement) regarding its obligations under Article 14.4 
(Non-Discriminatory Treatment of Digital Products), Article 14.11 
(Cross-Border Transfer of Information by Electronic Means) and 
Article 14.13 (Location of Computing Facilities) for a period of two 
years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement for Viet 
Nam.177 
In other words, the extra two-year transitional period has been 
granted to Malaysia and Viet Nam to comply with their obligations on 
personal data protection under Chapter 14 of the TPP. These strategies 
(such as ―special and differential treatment‖ strategies) can also be 
adopted by future regulators in order to better reflect on the interests of 
developing members in the process of international privacy law making. 
D. LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING & EXTRA GUARANTEE 
It is noteworthy that the TPP also contains numerous ―associated 
documents‖ relating to various TPP issues. For example, on February 4, 
2016, the United States and Australia exchanged a letter to establish a 
mutual understanding of privacy protection issues (as a part of the ‗TPP 
                                                     
 174 Id. at art. 14.13. 
 175 See, e.g., id. at art. 14.3.3. 
 176 See Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm (last 
visited May 9, 2016). 
 177 TPP, supra note 3, at art. 14.18. 
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text and associated documents‘).178 In this letter, the United States 
confirmed: 
Should the U.S. undertake any relevant additional commitments to 
those in the TPP Agreement with respect to the treatment of personal 
information of foreign nationals in another free trade agreement, it 
shall extend any such commitments to Australia. The U.S. will also 
endeavor to apply extensions of privacy protections with respect to 
personal information of foreign nations held by the U.S. Government 
to Australian citizens and permanent residents. 179 
It seems that, by going beyond the commitment of on personal 
information protection under the TPP, the United States has committed 
to provide extra protection for personal information held by the US 
Government to Australian citizens and permanent residents. So long as 
the United States agrees to offer any extra protection to personal 
information to any third countries via FTA (such as with the EU), such a 
protection will apply to Australia automatically. Moreover, the United 
States appears to have granted Australia with a unilateral most-favored-
nation (MFN) treatment on privacy protection for Australians. 
It is clear that Australian diplomats have done a fine job in 
securing privacy protection while in negotiation with their United States 
counterparts. Since Australia is the only state that has a letter of 
understanding in relation to privacy protection with the United States, its 
commitment only applies to Australia (rather than other TPP member 
states). In terms of future international law making, if such a provision 
(understanding) were equally and mutually be applied to all member 
states, it would significantly improve the level of privacy protection 
worldwide. 
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, although the privacy provisions in the TPP seem to 
mainly reflect the economic interests of the United States (as Greenleaf 
noted) the drafting and negotiation techniques (that are demonstrated in 
TPP) as well as the legislative strategies (that are adopted by TPP) could 
be learned from and adopted by future regulators/negotiators, in order to 
                                                     
 178 TPP, supra note 3 (see ‗associate document‘ session and ‗electronic commerce‘ subsection). 
 179 Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative, to Andrew Robb, 
Minister for Trade and Inv., Parliament House, Austl. (Feb. 4, 2016), 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Documents/australia-united-states-
privacy-protection.PDF. 
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help to make an international privacy protection treaty that strikes a 
better balance between the interests of all member states. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the implication of the Internet, 
particularly cloud computing technology, on cross-border personal data 
transfers. It particularly examined three major legal challenges that 
governments, businesses, and individual consumers have to address in 
the cloud-computing environment: (1) jurisdiction, (2) privacy and 
security, and (3) convergence. It further examined the new requirements 
of the TPP in relation to cross-border data transfer and data localization 
measures, and its implications for existing and future data protection law 
making. 
This article asserts that although the TPP is the ―first‖ 
international agreement establishing a link between privacy and trade, its 
impacts should be not overstated. The TPP has not significantly 
transformed the landscape of international personal data protection laws, 
nor has provided a direct solution for existing legal challenges of cross-
border data protection. To develop an effective solution, it is important to 
identify and fully understand all potential challenges of cross-border data 
protection in the current cloud computing and international trade 
environment, as well as understand the interactions and overlaps between 
these challenges. In fact, the improvement of public awareness on all 
potential legal challenges itself could serve as an indispensable part of 
resolution. 
The observation made by Johnson and Post in 1996 is still 
relevant and valuable in the current cloud computing and digital 
convergence context: 
Governments cannot stop electronic communication from coming 
across their borders, even if they want to do so. Nor can they credibly 
claim a right to regulate the Net based on supposed local harms 
caused by activities that originate outside their borders and that travel 
electronically to many different nations. One nation‘s legal 
institutions should not monopolize rule-making for the entire net.180 
Within the current globalization and digital convergence 
environment, it seems that no country can isolate itself from the legal 
                                                     
 180 David R. Johnston and David G. Post, Law and Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STANFORD L. REV. 1367, 1390 (1996). 
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challenges of cross-border data protection. It is also clear that no single 
country can address these challenges independently. Due to the 
transnational nature of cloud technology and the complexity of cross-
border data protection, it is important to adopt a more systemic approach, 
and make domestic and international approaches work collectively to 
address all potential challenges. Like many other international treaties, 
regardless of the limits and the sustainability of the TPP regime, it may 
still serve as a source of laws and provide some useful insights for 
international privacy law making in the future. 
 
